## Summary
This PR upgrades zizmor to the latest release in our CI. zizmor is a
static analyzer checking for security issues in GitHub workflows. The
new release finds some new issues in our workflows; this PR fixes some
of the issues, and adds ignores for some other issues.
The issues fixed in this PR are new cases of zizmor's
[`template-injection`](https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#template-injection)
rule being emitted. The issues I'm ignoring for now are all to do with
the
[`cache-poisoning`](https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#cache-poisoning)
rule. The main reason I'm fixing some but ignoring others is that I'm
confident fixing the template-injection diagnostics won't have any
impact on how our workflows operate in CI, but I'm worried that fixing
the cache-poisoning diagnostics could slow down our CI a fair bit. I
don't mind if somebody else is motivated to try to fix these
diagnostics, but for now I think I'd prefer to just ignore them; it
doesn't seem high-priority enough to try to fix them right now :-)
## Test Plan
- `uvx pre-commit run -a --hook-stage=manual` passes locally
- Let's see if CI passes on this PR...
## Summary
This PR changes our zizmor configuration to also flag low-severity
security issues in our GitHub Actions workflows. It's a followup to
https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff/pull/14844. The issues being fixed
here were all flagged by [zizmor's `template-injection`
rule](https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#template-injection):
> Detects potential sources of code injection via template expansion.
>
> GitHub Actions allows workflows to define template expansions, which
occur within special `${{ ... }}` delimiters. These expansions happen
before workflow and job execution, meaning the expansion of a given
expression appears verbatim in whatever context it was performed in.
>
> Template expansions aren't syntax-aware, meaning that they can result
in unintended shell injection vectors. This is especially true when
they're used with attacker-controllable expression contexts, such as
`github.event.issue.title` (which the attacker can fully control by
supplying a new issue title).
[...]
> To fully remediate the vulnerability, you should not use `${{
env.VARNAME }}`, since that is still a template expansion. Instead, you
should use `${VARNAME}` to ensure that the shell itself performs the
variable expansion.
## Test Plan
I tested that this passes all zizmore warnings by running `pre-commit
run -a zizmor` locally. The other test is obviously to check that the
workflows all still run correctly in CI 😄
This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Type | Update | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
|
[python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema](https://redirect.github.com/python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema)
| repository | minor | `0.29.4` -> `0.30.0` |
Note: The `pre-commit` manager in Renovate is not supported by the
`pre-commit` maintainers or community. Please do not report any problems
there, instead [create a Discussion in the Renovate
repository](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions/new)
if you have any questions.
---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema
(python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema)</summary>
###
[`v0.30.0`](https://redirect.github.com/python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.rst#0300)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/python-jsonschema/check-jsonschema/compare/0.29.4...0.30.0)
- Update vendored schemas: azure-pipelines, bitbucket-pipelines,
buildkite,
circle-ci, cloudbuild, dependabot, github-workflows, gitlab-ci, mergify,
readthedocs, renovate, taskfile, woodpecker-ci (2024-11-29)
- Fix caching behavior to always use URL hashes as cache keys. This
fixes a
cache confusion bug in which the wrong schema could be retrieved from
the
cache. This resolves :cve:`2024-53848`. Thanks :user:`sethmlarson` for
reporting!
- Deprecate the `--cache-filename` flag. It no longer has any effect and
will
be removed in a future release.
</details>
---
### Configuration
📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "before 4am on Monday" (UTC),
Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you
are satisfied.
♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
again.
---
- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box
---
This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
View the [repository job
log](https://developer.mend.io/github/astral-sh/ruff).
<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiIzOS40Mi40IiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiMzkuNDIuNCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsiaW50ZXJuYWwiXX0=-->
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
A [recent exploit](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x29-qqmq-v6qc)
brought attention to how easy it can be for attackers to use template
expansion in GitHub Actions workflows to inject arbitrary code into a
repository. That vulnerability [would have been caught by the zizmor
linter](https://blog.yossarian.net/2024/12/06/zizmor-ultralytics-injection),
which looks for potential security vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions
workflows. This PR adds [zizmor](https://github.com/woodruffw/zizmor) as
a pre-commit hook and fixes the high- and medium-severity warnings
flagged by the tool.
All the warnings fixed in this PR are related to this zizmor check:
https://woodruffw.github.io/zizmor/audits/#artipacked. The summary of
the check is that `actions/checkout` will by default persist git
configuration for the duration of the workflow, which can be insecure.
It's unnecessary unless you actually need to do things with `git` later
on in the workflow. None of our workflows do except for
`publish-docs.yml` and `sync-typeshed.yml`, so I set
`persist-credentials: true` for those two but `persist-credentials:
false` for all other uses of `actions/checkout`.
Unfortunately there are several warnings in `release.yml`, including
four high-severity warnings. However, this is a generated workflow file,
so I have deliberately excluded this file from the check. These are the
findings in `release.yml`:
<details>
<summary>release.yml findings</summary>
```
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:62:9
|
62 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
63 | | with:
64 | | submodules: recursive
| |_______________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:124:9
|
124 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
125 | | with:
126 | | submodules: recursive
| |_______________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:174:9
|
174 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
175 | | with:
176 | | submodules: recursive
| |_______________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:249:9
|
249 | - uses: actions/checkout@v4
| _________-
250 | | with:
251 | | submodules: recursive
252 | | # Create a GitHub Release while uploading all files to it
| |_______________________________________________________________- does not set persist-credentials: false
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
error[excessive-permissions]: overly broad workflow or job-level permissions
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:17:1
|
17 | / permissions:
18 | | "contents": "write"
... |
39 | | # If there's a prerelease-style suffix to the version, then the release(s)
40 | | # will be marked as a prerelease.
| |_________________________________^ contents: write is overly broad at the workflow level
|
= note: audit confidence → High
error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:80:9
|
80 | - id: plan
| _________^
81 | | run: |
| |_________^
82 | || dist ${{ (inputs.tag && inputs.tag != 'dry-run' && format('host --steps=create --tag={0}', inputs.tag)) || 'plan' }} --out...
83 | || echo "dist ran successfully"
84 | || cat plan-dist-manifest.json
85 | || echo "manifest=$(jq -c "." plan-dist-manifest.json)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ this step
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ inputs.tag may expand into attacker-controllable code
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:80:9
|
80 | - id: plan
| _________^
81 | | run: |
| |_________^
82 | || dist ${{ (inputs.tag && inputs.tag != 'dry-run' && format('host --steps=create --tag={0}', inputs.tag)) || 'plan' }} --out...
83 | || echo "dist ran successfully"
84 | || cat plan-dist-manifest.json
85 | || echo "manifest=$(jq -c "." plan-dist-manifest.json)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ this step
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ inputs.tag may expand into attacker-controllable code
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
--> /Users/alexw/dev/ruff/.github/workflows/release.yml:80:9
|
80 | - id: plan
| _________^
81 | | run: |
| |_________^
82 | || dist ${{ (inputs.tag && inputs.tag != 'dry-run' && format('host --steps=create --tag={0}', inputs.tag)) || 'plan' }} --out...
83 | || echo "dist ran successfully"
84 | || cat plan-dist-manifest.json
85 | || echo "manifest=$(jq -c "." plan-dist-manifest.json)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ this step
| ||__________________________________________________________________________________^ inputs.tag may expand into attacker-controllable code
|
= note: audit confidence → Low
```
</details>
## Test Plan
`uvx pre-commit run -a`
This adds documentation for the new test framework.
I also added documentation for the planned design of features we haven't
built yet (clearly marked as such), so that this doc can become the sole
source of truth for the test framework design (we don't need to refer
back to the original internal design document.)
Also fixes a few issues in the test framework implementation that were
discovered in writing up the docs.
---------
Co-authored-by: T-256 <132141463+T-256@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alex Waygood <Alex.Waygood@Gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dhruv Manilawala <dhruvmanila@gmail.com>
## Summary
This PR changes removes the typeshed stubs from the vendored file system
shipped with ruff
and instead ships an empty "typeshed".
Making the typeshed files optional required extracting the typshed files
into a new `ruff_vendored` crate. I do like this even if all our builds
always include typeshed because it means `red_knot_python_semantic`
contains less code that needs compiling.
This also allows us to use deflate because the compression algorithm
doesn't matter for an archive containing a single, empty file.
## Test Plan
`cargo test`
I verified with ` cargo tree -f "{p} {f}" -p <package> ` that:
* red_knot_wasm: enables `deflate` compression
* red_knot: enables `zstd` compression
* `ruff`: uses stored
I'm not quiet sure how to build the binary that maturin builds but
comparing the release artifact size with `strip = true` shows a `1.5MB`
size reduction
---------
Co-authored-by: Charlie Marsh <charlie.r.marsh@gmail.com>
## Summary
This PR separates the current `red_knot` crate into two crates:
1. `red_knot` - This will be similar to the `ruff` crate, it'll act as
the CLI crate
2. `red_knot_workspace` - This includes everything except for the CLI
functionality from the existing `red_knot` crate
Note that the code related to the file watcher is in
`red_knot_workspace` for now but might be required to extract it out in
the future.
The main motivation for this change is so that we can have a `red_knot
server` command. This makes it easier to test the server out without
making any changes in the VS Code extension. All we need is to specify
the `red_knot` executable path in `ruff.path` extension setting.
## Test Plan
- `cargo build`
- `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features`
- `cargo shear --fix`
Extend red-knot type inference to cover all syntax, so that inferring
types for a scope gives all expressions a type. This means we can run
the red-knot semantic lint on all Python code without panics. It also
means we can infer types for `builtins.pyi` without panics.
To keep things simple, this PR intentionally doesn't add any new type
inference capabilities: the expanded coverage is all achieved with
`Type::Unknown`. But this puts the skeleton in place for adding better
inference of all these language features.
I also had to add basic Salsa cycle recovery (with just `Type::Unknown`
for now), because some `builtins.pyi` definitions are cyclic.
To test this, I added a comprehensive corpus of test snippets sourced
from Cinder under [MIT
license](https://github.com/facebookincubator/cinder/blob/cinder/3.10/cinderx/LICENSE),
which matches Ruff's license. I also added to this corpus some
additional snippets for newer language features: all the
`27_func_generic_*` and `73_class_generic_*` files, as well as
`20_lambda_default_arg.py`, and added a test which runs semantic-lint
over all these files. (The test doesn't assert the test-corpus files are
lint-free; just that they are able to lint without a panic.)
